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•  In the planned economy period, the Soviet government heavily supported both 
agricultural producers and food consumers. Large budget subsidies were necessary to 
support both groups. The assistance resulted in overproduction and overconsumption of 
agricultural products, in particular livestock goods, relative to the USSR's real income 
and resources. 
•  The move from a planned to a market economy during the transition period substantially 
reduced support to both producers and consumers. This resulted in a severe drop in 
agricultural production, especially of livestock products and animal feed. 
•  During transition, producer assistance has gone through four distinct phases: (1) in 1992 a 
steep plunge, resulting in high taxation; (2) over 1993-97 a steady but large move from 
taxation to support; (3) in 1998-99 a major drop in support; and (4) since 2000 a rise in 
aggregate assistance, though with a divided outcome, whereby livestock products and 
sugar are supported while grain and sunflowerseed are generally taxed. 
•  During transition, budget subsidies to agriculture have substantially diminished. The 
main discretionary policy used to support agriculture has been soft loans to farms by state 
or parastatal lenders, with most of the debt eventually being written off. The fall in 
budget subsidies does not reflect the desire by the government to downsize the sector, but 
rather its financial straits. Also, the drop in budget subsidies does not explain the 
fluctuating pattern of support described above. 
•  Throughout transition, agricultural producers have been subsidized to some degree by the 
government's energy pricing policy, whereby domestic users of energy products pay 
prices below the prices at which Russia exports energy. By the mid-2000s, such 
"subsidies" existed to some degree for oil products, and strongly for natural gas. The 
latter, however, is not heavily used in agricultural production. Also, the gas subsidy is not 
specific to agriculture, as all domestic users of natural gas pay less than export prices. 
•  Most of the fluctuations in the calculated levels of assistance to agriculture has come 
from changes in the gaps between domestic and border prices. Not only have the price 
gaps varied, but the size of the gaps has been generally large. Conventional border 
measures cannot explain most of the magnitude or fluctuation of the gaps. Agricultural 
import tariffs have been moderate, with the annual average tariff ranging from 10 to 15 
percent. The most important border measures have been a complicated system of import 
controls for sugar since the late 1990s, a 20 percent export tariff for sunflowerseed 
imposed in 2000, and a restrictive regime of tariff rate quotas for meat imports created in 
2003. 
•  The main cause of the large price gaps and their variation appears to be movement in the 
real exchange rate combined with poor transmission to domestic prices. Agricultural 
policies, especially at the regional level, account for part of the incomplete transmission. 
Another apparent cause is deficient infrastructure ─ physical, commercial, and 
institutional ─ which works to isolate domestic regional markets from international 
markets. 
•  During transition, import tariffs for manufactured goods have been on average between 8 
and 12 percent. The border protection for non-farm products indirectly reduces the real  
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level of assistance to agriculture. By the mid-2000s, assistance to agriculture was 
moderately higher than for goods in other tradable sectors, which means that policy was 
helping the agro-food sector relative to the rest of the economy. 
•  The large decline in budget subsidies to the agro-food sector during transition has 
eliminated the support that food consumers enjoyed during the planned period. In the 
place of those subsidies, agricultural import tariffs have taxed consumers. 
•  Since 2000, Russia has enjoyed relatively high GDP growth and rising world prices for 
its energy exports, which have increased government revenue. In 2005, the government 
announced that, as part of a new social welfare policy, agriculture will be one of four 
areas to receive expanded funding, along with health, education, and housing. In 
agriculture, the priority will be on reviving the livestock sector. 
•  Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization might not liberalize the country's 
agricultural policies. With the exception of tariff rate quotas for meat imports and the 
complex sugar import regime, Russia's border and support measures currently are fairly 
moderate. For both tariffs and domestic support, Russia is asking for bound levels above 
current behaviors. Even if the negotiated levels lay somewhere between current behaviors 
and Russia's requested levels, WTO entry would not liberalize the country's policies. 
•  Russia's current agricultural trade flows indicate that the country has a comparative 
advantage in producing grain and sunflowerseed and a comparative disadvantage in 
producing livestock products and sugar. Russian policy and market conditions are 
working to tax production of the former and support production of the latter. The 
government appears to be more concerned with reviving the livestock sector than with 
capitalizing on the country's potential as a bulk crop exporter. 
•  Russia's support policies are generally consistent with political economy theory. The 
livestock and sugar sectors are import-competing and have a comparative disadvantage in 
the world market. Theory predicts that these features will generate support for the sector.  
In agriculture as a whole, wages and incomes have fallen relative to the rest of the 
economy. In the past five years, the share of food in total consumer expenditure has 
dropped. From a political economy perspective, these two developments are also 












This chapter examines and measures policy distortions to producer and consumer incentives in 
Russian agriculture. The empirical scope is from the mid-1980s (of the Soviet planned period) to 
the mid 2000s. Two general types of distortion are investigated − direct and indirect. Direct 
distortions result from policies specific to the agro-food economy, and include budget subsidies, 
the pricing of inputs, and market price support. Indirect distortions result from policies outside of 
agriculture, the main distortion examined in this chapter being trade policy (specifically import 
tariffs) for non-farm products. 
A special focus of the chapter is on explaining the strong fluctuation in observed 
producer support during the transition period. As identified in the summary, the main cause of 
the fluctuation is movement in Russia’s exchange rate combined with policies and poor market 
institutions and infrastructure inherited from the Soviet period. The latter impede transmission of 
changes in the exchange rate to domestic prices, thereby contributing to gaps between domestic 
and border prices. The policy implication is that strengthening macroeconomic stability and 
improving domestic institutions and infrastructure might do as much or more to reduce price 
gaps and their distorting effects as would liberalizing agricultural and trade policies. 
To examine and measure the exchange rate-transmission effect for Russian agriculture 
during transition, we use a method from Liefert (2007) for decomposing changes in agricultural 
producer prices. The key variables in the decomposition are world prices, the exchange rate, and 
agricultural import tariffs. The method allows one to determine which of these variables is 
dominant in changing domestic prices and thereby incentives to produce, consume, and trade 
goods.  The method also allows one to measure the degree to which incomplete transmission of 
changes in exchange rates and world prices affects domestic producer prices.  
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The chapter is organized as follows. The first section examines agricultural policies and 
the magnitude of assistance to producers and consumers during the Soviet planned period. The 
next section examines the policies and levels of assistance to producers and consumers during 
the transition period. The policy set includes budget subsidies, input pricing, border measures, 
and the indirect assistance (or taxation) that results from border measures for nonagro-food 
products. This section will also examine the issues discussed in the previous paragraphs − how 
fluctuating exchange rates have combined with incomplete transmission to contribute to 
domestic to border price gaps. The final section discusses the likely future direction of Russian 
agricultural policies and incentive effects, and in so doing draws on political economy theory. 
 
 
Agricultural policy and assistance during the Soviet planned period 
 
 
Serfdom ended in the Russian Empire in 1861. After emancipation, however, the gentry and state 
retained over half of all agricultural land. Although the newly-freed peasants were given plots to 
farm, they had to “redeem” their plots with payments that typically lasted for decades. Until they 
wholly paid off their land, the peasants had to belong to their village commune, or mir. The mir 
imposed strong constraints on its members, such as collective responsibility for all debts and 
periodic redistribution of plots that households farmed. These restrictions and the huge debt the 
peasants carried for their land made it difficult for them to become independent producers. 
Although the Stolypin reforms of 1906 and 1910 tried to weaken communal agriculture imposed 
by the mir and promote independent landholdings, World War I and the revolution intervened 
before a strong tradition of profitable independent farmers could be established.
1 
  When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, they redistributed all land held by the 
gentry to the peasants. During the civil war against their various internal enemies, however, the 
                                                 
1 For a good review of Russian agricultural policy and developments during both the immediate pre-Soviet and 
Soviet periods, see Gregory and Stuart (1990), which is the source of most of the specific figures given in our 
discussion of these periods.  
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Bolsheviks imposed the harsh economic policy of War Communism. For agriculture and the 
peasants, the policy essentially involved confiscation of most output with little compensation. 
After the Bolsheviks secured their power in the early 1920s, they abandoned War 
Communism and created the milder New Economic Policy (NEP). Peasants were allowed to buy 
and sell inputs and outputs under fairly free market conditions, and taxation was not onerous.  
Incentives to produce improved, so that by 1928 agricultural output was about 10 percent higher 
than in 1913 (immediately before World War I). The NEP helped generate a class of relatively 
prosperous and independent peasant producers ─ the “kulaks”. 
In 1929, soon after Stalin achieved dominance in the Soviet leadership, the USSR began 
the collectivization of agriculture. The peasants’ land, livestock, and equipment were 
confiscated, and large new farms were formed from these assets which the peasants had to join. 
Many resisted, often by slaughtering their livestock, such that animal numbers in the mid-1930’s 
were down by about 40-50 percent compared to 1928. The state responded brutally, targeting the 
more prosperous kulaks. The chaos and repression led to a serious famine, which the government 
abetted to punish and cow the peasantry. Conquest (1986) puts total peasant deaths from all 
collectivization-related events ─ executions, imprisonment, resettlement, and the famine ─ at 14 
million. Although the famine and repression were centered in the Ukraine, the most 
agriculturally rich part of the USSR, Russia was also severely affected.   
  One motive for collectivization was the state’s desire to extract “forced savings” from 
agriculture to promote rapid industrialization. This was to be achieved by paying farms low 
prices for agricultural output, resulting in low wages for farm labor. Yet during the 1930s 
agriculture also received considerable investment and input allocations. Researchers disagree as 
to whether agriculture as a producing sector provided substantially more output and resources to 
the rest of the economy than it received. There is agreement, however, that farm workers were 
exploited by the low wages set for them. By 1933, their per capita income was only about half 
the level of 1928, and by the late 1930s it was still only about three-quarters the level.
2 
  Collectivization integrated agriculture into the country’s planned economy, and created 
rural structures and institutions that remained largely intact for the rest of the Soviet period. The 
                                                 
2 Industrial workers were also exploited by low real wages, though probably not as strongly as farm workers. During 
the 1930s, the share of investment in GDP soared at the expense of consumption.  
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collective farms received input allocations and output targets directly from the state planners. 
Large “state farms” also existed, and steadily grew in number after the Second World War, 
though over time the differences between them and collective farms became slight. Various 
agricultural reforms and organizational changes, both at the farm level and above, were 
attempted during the postwar period, but always with only minor effect on the basic system of 
farm management and incentives and on productivity. 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, state investment and subsidies to agriculture began to 
increase substantially. According to Treml (1982), agricultural subsidies grew from 2 billion 
rubles in 1965 to 37 billion rubles in 1980, so that by 1980 subsidies equaled 54 percent of the 
value of national income produced by agriculture. Farm worker income also rose substantially, 
such that the income gap between agricultural and non-agricultural workers narrowed. Although 
output also grew during this time, productivity growth was poor (Johnson and Brooks 1983).  
Output rose mainly because of the large rise in investment, subsidies and input use, rather than 
from more productive use of resources. 
The rise in investment and subsidies centered on increasing production of livestock 
products, which was a major part of the leadership’s program to improve consumers’ standard of 
living. Consequently, from 1970 to 1990 Soviet (and Russian) livestock herds and output rose by 
about 50 percent. The rise in feed requirements also stimulated the crop sector, such that by the 
late 1980s output of feed grain was also up by about half compared to two decades earlier.  In 
1990, primary agriculture accounted for about 13 percent of Russian GDP and employment 
(Table 1). 
By 1990, Soviet/Russian per capita consumption of livestock products and foodstuffs in 
general compared favorably to levels in many rich Western countries. For example, Soviet per 
capita meat consumption was 75 kilograms, compared to 72 in Great Britain and 62 in Finland. 
Since Soviet per capita GDP was less than half that of most OECD countries, the USSR was 
producing and consuming high-cost livestock products at a much higher volume than one would 
expect based on the country's real income (Sedik 1993). 
To support the high levels of production and consumption of livestock products and 
animal feed during the 1970s and 1980s, high rates of assistance to both producers and 
consumers were necessary. Figure 1 presents nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) for Soviet  
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agricultural producers in 1986 (the percentage by which receipts by farmers are above what 
they would be without agro-food policy interventions. They are calculated from producer support 
estimates (PSEs) for the USSR by Cook, Liefert and Koopman (1991). Although the NRAs in 
the figure cover the entire Soviet Union rather than just Russia, in 1986 Russia accounted for 46 
percent of Soviet agricultural output (USSR Central Statistical Department 1988, p. 426). The 
commodities for which Cook et al. compute PSEs accounted for 80 percent of Russia’s 
agricultural production in 1986. 
Like PSEs, the NRA estimates cover two types of support to producers – budget transfers 
and market price support (MPS), the latter being the difference between the domestic and border 
price that results from price and trade policies. Computing MPS requires an exchange rate for 
converting border prices from foreign to domestic values. In their PSE calculations, Cook et al. 
do not use the official Soviet exchange rate of 0.6 rubles to the U.S. dollar, which strongly 
overvalued the ruble. Use of this exchange rate would overstate support to producers, by pushing 
down border prices for commodities measured in ruble values, which in turn would push the PSE 
(and NRA) values up. Rather, Cook et al. estimate and use a shadow exchange rate of 1.9 rubles 
to the dollar. 
In Figure 1, the producer aggregate NRA value is based on the assumption that the NRA 
calculated from those commodities for which Cook et al. present PSEs also gives the aggregate 
NRA for those commodities for which Cook et al. do not present PSEs. This means that the 
aggregate NRA computed from the Cook et al. PSE commodities gives the NRA for total 
agricultural output. 
The results in Figure 1 indicate that Soviet agricultural policies in the 1980s heavily 
supported producers. If the aggregate NRA is accurate, in 1986 producers received revenues 
from production that were about 30 percent higher than what they would have received if no 
budget transfers or market intervention-type agricultural price and trade policies had existed. 
Sugar producers received extremely high support and livestock producers above average support, 
while producers of sunflowerseed, and especially grain, received below average support. About  
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three-fifths of the assistance to agriculture was budget transfers, with the main transfer subsidy 
being for input use, and the other two-fifths of assistance was MPS.
3 
  Besides budget transfers and MPS, Soviet (and Russian) agricultural producers in the 
planned period were supported in a third way − through the pricing policy for physical capital 
inputs, such as tractors, combines, and trucks, as well as for material inputs, such as fuel and 
fertilizer. Farm purchase prices for these inputs were set below either the real cost of 
domestically producing them, or below the prices at which the Soviet Union exported the 
products (as in the case of fuel and other energy). Evidence for the argument that Soviet input 
price policy subsidized agricultural producers is that when Russia liberalized prices and trade at 
the beginning of its transition in the early 1990s, producer output prices rose much less than 
producer input prices. This meant that agricultural producers' domestic terms of trade (output 
prices divided by input prices) deteriorated. For example, from 1990 to 1994, Russian producers' 
terms of trade worsened by about 75 percent (OECD 1999). 
  The PSEs by Cook et al. on which the producer NRAs are based do not include the 
subsidy that producers received from input price policies. The input subsidies included in the 
PSEs and NRAs cover only direct budget transfers. The reason for the omission is that PSEs are 
conventionally defined as measuring the effect of policies that are specific to agriculture, while 
all users of fuel and other forms of energy in the Soviet Union paid prices below the country's 
export prices for the products, not just farmers. Nonetheless, input price policies did increase the 
real level of support to agricultural producers, especially when support is assessed using world 
trade prices as the opportunity cost values of tradable inputs. Like agriculture-targeted subsidies, 
Soviet input price policies contributed to distorted excess resource use and agricultural 
overproduction in the planned period. 
                                                 
3 OECD computes annual PSEs for Russian agriculture during the Soviet period from 1986 through 1991, as well as 
for the subsequent transition years. Producer NRAs could therefore be calculated based on these PSE values. 
However, in its Russia PSE calculations for 1986-89, OECD uses the Soviet official exchange rate of 0.6 rubles to 
the dollar, while for 1990-91 OECD adjusts the official rate to reflect market-influenced rates. OECD's aggregate 
agricultural PSE for Russia in 1986 is 83 percent, which contrasts with the aggregate PSE for Soviet agriculture 
from Cook et al. of 26 percent. Recognizing that the official exchange rate overstates the value of the ruble, OECD 
also experiments in computing PSEs with exchange rates adjusted by using the World Bank Atlas Conversion Factor 
(OECD 1998, p. 170). The adjusted exchange rate for 1986 is 1.24 rubles to the dollar. Use of this exchange rate 
reduces the Russian aggregate PSE for 1986 to 65 percent, which is still high relative to the 1986 Cook et al. PSE 
for the Soviet Union (based on an exchange rate of 1.9 rubles to the dollar).  
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Figure 1 indicates that during the Soviet period, consumers of agro-food products were 
also generally supported. The consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) in the figure are based on 
estimates of consumer support estimates (CSEs) for Soviet consumers in 1986 by Cook et al., 
including their use of the shadow exchange rate of 1.9 rubles to the dollar. As with the producer 
NRAs, the aggregate CTE value is based on the assumption that the CTE calculated from 
commodities for which Cook et al. present CSEs also gives the aggregate CTE for those 
commodities for which Cook et al. do not present CSEs. For CTEs, positive values indicate 
taxation and negative values assistance. For example, the aggregate CTE value of about minus 
25 percent means that consumers were paying prices for agricultural goods a quarter lower than 
the border price. 
The CTEs in Figure 1 are for the final consumers of food purchased at the retail level. 
The reason both producers and consumers of agricultural products could be supported during the 
Soviet period is that food consumers were subsidized at the processing level. Food processors 
sold their output to retailers at prices below their production costs, and received state subsidies to 
cover the difference. The figure shows that although food consumers in general were subsidized, 
and especially those of livestock products and grain, consumers of sugar and sunflowerseed were 
taxed by paying border prices. In the USSR, the retail purchasers of sugar in particular paid high 
sales taxes. Yet, the CTE values in Figure 1 understate the real support to consumers (or 
overstate the level of taxation for specific commodities), given that the Soviet input price 
policies discussed earlier subsidized consumers by lowering food prices.
4 
  On the other hand, the Soviet economy involved certain costs to consumers that could be 
viewed as systemic “taxation.” Retail prices for most foods were set below not just the full cost 
of production and opportunity cost border prices, but also below the internal market clearing 
                                                 
4 OECD also computes annual CSEs for Russian agriculture from 1986 through 1991, on which CTE calculations 
could be based. As with its PSE estimates, however, the OECD uses the Soviet official exchange rate, though it 
again also experiments using an exchange rate adjusted by the World Bank Atlas Conversion Factor. In addition, the 
OECD CSE estimates do not measure support to food consumers at the retail level, but rather at the farm level; that 
is, the CSEs cover the effect on consumers from farm level policies alone. The CSEs therefore do not capture the 
large support to consumers that came from the budget subsidies given to the food processing industry. For these 
reasons, OECD's CSEs for the planned period show heavy taxation rather than support to consumers, with the 
aggregate CSE in 1986 being minus 72 percent. This contrasts with the aggregate CSE from Cook et al. of a positive 
34 percent. (Bear in mind that with conventionally computed CSEs, a positive value means that consumers are 
supported and a negative value they are taxed. This contrasts with the CTEs calculated in this World Bank project, 




5 Consequently, excess demand existed, which created artificial market shortages. The 
excess demand led to allocation by queuing and other search costs for food. This means that the 
prices used by Cook et al. to compute CSEs understate the full cost to consumers of obtaining 
food, which in turn overstates the real subsidy that consumers received from paying low prices. 
More generally, by determining the volumes and mix of all consumer goods to be produced, the 
Soviet planned economy “taxed” consumers by depriving them of consumer sovereignty. The 
population was consuming a sub-optimal mix of goods compared to what they would have 
purchased and consumed had a market-oriented economy been responding to their demand for 
goods and services. From a narrow point of view, Soviet food consumers were subsidized. From 
a larger point of view, the subsidy is less than that revealed by the CTEs in Figure 1. 
Although the results in Figure 1 are specific to 1986, Soviet/Russian agricultural and food 
policies did not change substantially during the last years of the USSR through to 1991 (although 
there were some minor steps toward policy liberalization). In 1990, budget subsidies to the 
Soviet agro-food system alone equaled about 10 percent of GDP. Large subsidies were 
continuing to support both ends of the food chain. 
 
 
Assistance during the transition period 
 
 
Although minor economic reforms began in Russia during the late planned period, the major 
reforms of the transition period began in 1992. The planned economy was replaced by a market-
oriented one, although in agriculture the state continued to a diminishing degree to help farms 
obtain inputs, and to purchase a nontrivial share of output of certain commodities (such as grain). 
Before examining the key transition agricultural policies and their effects, it would be useful to 
identify the main types of producers during the reform period. 
By the mid-1990s, there were three types of agricultural producers, which have remained 
throughout the transition period: the former state and collective farms, family farms, and 
                                                 
5 Soviet consumer prices were set low not only for food but also for other many goods and services, such as most 
clothing, shoes, toiletries and other personal items, housing and transport.  
 
12
household plots (Liefert 2001). During the early transition years, most of the former state and 
collective farms were "reorganized" as joint stock companies owned by their management and 
workers. They produce most of the country's bulk crops − grain, sunflowerseed, and sugar. 
Family farms are a creation of the reform period, but have not flourished. The 260,000 or so 
family farms existing in the mid-2000s average about 70 hectares in size, and account for no 
more than 5 percent of the country's agricultural land and output (Rosstat 2004, pp. 444-46). The 
household plots are tended by families associated with the large farms. Though averaging only 
half a hectare in size, by the mid-2000s the plots were producing about half of the country's total 
agricultural output, and most of its livestock products, potatoes, and vegetables (Rosstat 2004, p. 
444). One reason the plots account for such a disproportionate share of total agricultural output is 
because they specialize in high-value products relative to their land use.
 
There were three main transition policies that affected agricultural production and 
consumption: the severe reduction of budget subsidies; price liberalization; and trade 
liberalization. Each of these policies can be matched with one of the three main types of support 
during the planned period − budget subsidies, input price policy, and market price support − and 
in each case the transition policy substantially reduced the support maintained during the planned 
period. A more detailed discussion of these three policies will be given later. What follows is a 
brief examination of how the major transition policies affected agricultural output. 
  Price liberalization resulted in prices for both agricultural outputs and inputs jumping to 
reflect the actual high cost of production. Input prices rose substantially more than output prices, 
such that farmers' terms of trade worsened (as discussed earlier). Trade liberalization reduced the 
market price support of the planned period, the isolated effect being a drop in real output prices 
for most commodities. Trade liberalization also resulted in domestic prices for tradable 
agricultural inputs, such as fuel and fertilizer, rising closer to Russian export prices. These 
developments hurt domestic producers' terms of trade vis-à-vis inputs even more (Liefert and 
Swinnen 2002). The terms of trade deterioration resulted in a plunge in input use. For example, 
in 2000 Russian farms used only about a quarter as much gasoline and diesel fuel as in 1990. 
Also over this time span, mineral fertilizer use per hectare of sown land fell from 88 to 19 
kilograms (Goskomstat 2002, pp. 410-11).  
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The slashing of budget subsidies and worsening of producers' terms of trade caused a 
severe drop in agricultural output, especially in the livestock sector (figure 2).
6 Crop production 
has fluctuated throughout the transition period, reflecting the vagaries of weather in Russia. The 
trend through 1998, though, was clearly negative, with some rebound thereafter. Table 1 shows 
that from 1990 to 2003, agriculture's share in GDP fell from about 13 to 4.6 percent. The decline 
in primary agricultural output in the 1990s was matched by a big drop in food processing. 
Figure 2 shows that industrial output decreased substantially during transition, which 
suggests that the planned economy also "subsidized" industry relative to how a market-driven 
economy would have behaved. The major sector of the economy that did not decline much was 
services. Ad hoc evidence suggests that many services not provided by the planned economy 
came into being during the early transition years, which Russia's statistical system had difficulty 
reporting. Thus, Figure 2 might overstate the initial drop in services and understate their later 
growth. This suggests that the planned economy subsidized both agriculture and industry vis-à-
vis the service sector. Whether agriculture was assisted more than other tradable sectors prior to 
the transition is unclear.  
Tables 2 and 3 present producer NRAs for the transition period. The row “Total 
agriculture including NPS” in Table 2 gives the annual aggregate NRA for agricultural 
producers, and provides the data for Figure 3. Table 3 gives commodity-specific producer NRAs, 
as well as aggregate NRAs for (net) imported and exported commodities, thereby providing the 
data for Figures 4 and 5. The relative rate of assistance (RRA) at the bottom of Table 2 expresses 
assistance to agricultural producers relative to that to producers of tradable non-agricultural 
goods (discussed later). 
The NRAs are calculated mainly from OECD’s PSE database for Russia. “Covered 
products” in Table 2 refer to those commodities for which we compute individual NRAs. As the 
bottom row of Table 3 shows, these products cover 77 percent of all Russian agricultural output 
in 1992, although the figure falls to 65 percent by 2005. The coverage for traded agricultural 
                                                 
6 The large drop in production of livestock goods resulted in a substantial decline in their per capita consumption. 
Consumption of staple foods such as bread and potatoes, however, did not fall much, or even increased (Liefert and 
Swinnen 2002). This means that the big decline in agricultural output did not create serious problems for overall 
food security. Crop output fell mainly because the large decrease in livestock production reduced demand for feed 
grain. The drop in crop output therefore did not reduce food available for human consumption.  
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products, however, is higher. The commodities for which we calculate individual NRAs are 
those for which OECD provides commodity-specific budget subsidies and computes market 
price support.
7 The aggregate NRAs presented can cover all of agricultural production, under the 
assumption that the annual aggregate NRA computed from our covered commodities gives the 
NRA for uncovered commodities as well.
 
When Russia began its major economic reform in 1992, the country abolished the official 
exchange rate of the Soviet period and moved to a system of largely market-determined 
exchange rates. Thus, OECD's Russian PSEs for the transition period beginning in 1992 stop 
being based on overvalued official exchange rates. 
The negative value for producer assistance in 1992 in Figure 3 reveals a plunge in 
producer support from the positive assistance during the planned period. In fact, during transition 
producer assistance, as measured by the aggregate NRA, has fluctuated considerably, with 
definite turning points: (1) a huge decline in 1992, resulting in taxation; (2) a steady but large 
rise over 1993-97, such that during 1994-97 producers in the aggregate were being assisted; (3) a 
major decline over 1998-1999, such that by the latter year aggregate support was almost nil; and 
(4) a rebound beginning in 2001, such that by 2005 assistance equaled 20 percent. 
Although the commodity-specific producer NRAs in Figure 4 show some variation from 
the movement in the aggregate NRA, they support the general pattern as revealed in Figure 3, 
with largely the same turning points.
8 The NRA for importables in Figure 5 also generally 
follows the pattern of Figure 3. Net imported agricultural products throughout the transition 
include all the meats, milk, sugar, and corn, while the remaining grains, sunflowerseed, and eggs 
have switched during transition between net export and import status (though sunflowerseed in 
almost all years has been a net export). Figure 5 shows that exportables have not closely 
followed the NRA pattern of Figure 3, rather their NRA has oscillated more on a yearly basis.  
                                                 
7 Until recently, for all member and nonmember countries for which it computed PSEs, OECD calculated PSEs for 
individual commodities, as well as an agricultural aggregate PSE. In 2007, however, OECD stopped calculating 
commodity-specific PSEs for all countries (members as well as nonmembers). A major reason was the difficulty in 
allocating input subsidies and decoupled support, such as direct income payments, among specific commodities for 
many countries. Yet, OECD continues to compute commodity-specific budget subsidies directly linked to 
production and commodity-specific market price support. 
8 Appendix Tables 2 and 3 also give annual producer NRAs and consumer tax equivalents calculated for all 




This is largely because the exportable commodities are mainly crops, whose annual output is 
heavily affected by weather. The weather-induced fluctuation in production results in fluctuating 
domestic prices, which in turn causes the NRA to oscillate. Yet, Table 4 shows that during 
transition Russia has been a much larger agricultural importer than exporter. For example, over 
2001-04, the average annual value of agro-food imports was $10.4 billion, while exports were 
only $1.9 billion.   
The following subsections examine how assistance to agricultural producers has changed 
during transition, focusing on three types of support policies: (1) budget subsidies; (2) input 
pricing; and (3) border policies that can generate market price support. Special attention is paid 




During the transition period, budget subsidies to agricultural producers have fallen substantially 
(Figure 6, in which budget subsidies equal output, input, and other subsidies). For scale reasons, 
figure 6 does not include any year of the planned period. In 1990, however, budget transfers to 
producers equaled about 30 billion Euros (computed using the Soviet official exchange rate, and 
for the 81 percent share of agricultural output covered by OECD's PSEs for Russia), which 
dropped in 1992 to 3.2 billion Euros.
9 After this huge decline, the subsidies rose a bit in the mid-
1990s, but then fell again in the last years of the decade, largely because of the economic crisis 
of 1998. From 2000 to 2005, budget subsidies rose only slightly in Euro values. OECD-
calculated budget transfers to Russian producers in 2005 equaled only 1.8 billion Euros (OECD 
PSE database for Russia). The bulk of the transfers have continued to be input subsidies, which 
accounted for three-quarters of total budget subsidies in the early 2000s. 
  Budget transfers plunged during the transition period not because of the desire of the 
agricultural and political establishments to reduce them and downsize the sector, but rather 
because of the shortage of federal funding during transition. As federal budget subsidies to 
                                                 
9 As discussed earlier, the Soviet official exchange rate highly overvalued the ruble, which inflates the Euro-
denominated value of subsidies in 1990. Yet, even if the exchange rate estimated by Cook et al. for 1986 (1.9 rubles 
to the dollar versus the official rate of 0.6 rubles/dollar) is used to convert to foreign currency values, budget 
subsidies in the planned period were much higher than in the early transition years.  
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agriculture fell, the regional (oblast) governments had the option to substitute their own 
subsidies. By 2005, 76 percent of all budget transfers to agriculture came from regional and local 
governments (OECD includes these subsidies in its PSE estimates, which means our NRA 
calculations also capture them). However, some of the regional support to agriculture indirectly 
comes from the federal government, through the latter’s subsidies to regional budgets. 
As direct budget subsidies to agriculture declined during transition, the government 
began to subsidize farms through a policy of soft loans from state or parastatal lenders, with 
periodic debt write-offs. In computing PSEs, OECD includes these soft loans and debt 
forgiveness in its budget transfers, under the category of input subsidies. OECD allocates the 
debt write-off in a given year by treating the relevant loans in each preceding year as a budget 




As discussed earlier, price and trade liberalization quickly reduced the large subsidy that 
agricultural producers and consumers received from the pricing policies for inputs during the 
planned period. For example, in 1990 Russian farms had to produce 38 tons of grain to purchase 
a tractor, while in 2003 they had to produce 186 tons. Likewise, a ton of diesel fuel cost farms 
0.4 tons of grain in 1990, compared to 3.5 tons in 2003 (Rosstat 1998 and 2004). 
At various times in the transition period, farm purchase prices for fertilizer, fuel, and 
other energy have been below world, and specifically Russia’s export, prices for these products, 
resulting in some continuation of this type of subsidy from the Soviet period. This, for example, 
was generally the case in 1999-2000 (Liefert 2005). By 2003, however, this form of subsidy 
appeared to have diminished substantially. For most oil products, Russian farms were in fact 
paying prices above those at which the country exported, the difference being taxes assessed on 
the domestic purchases.
10 The one exception is that throughout the transition period, natural gas 
has been sold to farms (as well as all other domestic users) at prices far below the gas' export 
price. In 2003, for example, the domestic price for natural gas was only about a quarter of the 
                                                 
10 This conclusion is based on comparison of farm purchase prices for inputs from Rosstat (2004 )and export unit 
values for the inputs computed from the Russian Federation State Customs Committee (various years).  
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export price. Although natural gas is not a major input in agricultural production, it is a key 
input in producing fertilizer. With the surge in world oil prices in the mid-2000s, Russian farms 
returned to the situation of paying prices for fuel below world prices. 
Neither the change in budget subsidies nor the decline in implicit subsidies that resulted 
from price liberalization can explain the severe fluctuation in producers' NRAs during transition. 
The budget subsidy levels did not fluctuate much (after the big initial drop), and the subsidies 
from input price policy are not captured by the NRAs calculated from OECD’s Russian PSE 
database. (Like the PSEs computed by Cook et al. for the USSR, OECD's PSEs for Russia 
include input subsidies that take the form of government budget subsidies, but not implicit 
support from input pricing.) The explanation therefore appears to lie in calculated market price 
support. 
 
Border measures and market price support 
 
In 1990, market price support (MPS) for Russian producers was about 70 billion Euros (as 
computed by OECD for those commodities for which it calculates MPS), and in 1992 it fell to 
negative 17 billion Euros (Figure 6). As discussed earlier, OECD uses the overvalued Soviet 
official exchange rate in computing PSEs for the planned period, which results in a high MPS 
estimate. That point notwithstanding, one can conclude that reform substantially reversed 
Russian MPS. Figure 6 shows that MPS as conventionally computed then continued to fluctuate 
throughout the transition period. Figure 7 also supports this conclusion. The percentage price gap 
in that figure is computed as the domestic value of agricultural production in producer prices 
(V
d) minus the value of production measured in border prices (V
b), divided by the value of 





percentage price gap moves considerably over the transition period, although the fluctuations are 
in multi-years cycles, not annual oscillations up and down. 
                                                 
11 The percentage price gap is equivalent to the nominal rate of protection for total agriculture. The numerator of the 
percentage price gap also equals MPS as conventionally calculated, with one qualification. In computing MPS for 
livestock products, OECD includes a feed adjustment coefficient that captures the difference between domestic and 
border prices for animal feed. For example, if Russia supports its feed producers such that domestic feed prices are  
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As mentioned earlier, Table 4 shows that during transition Russia has been mainly an 
agricultural importer. Tariffs have been the main border measure, the main exception being tariff 
rate quotas created for meat imports in 2003 (discussed later in greater detail). Figure 7 reveals 
that since 1994, the average (trade-weighted) tariff on agro-food imports has been fairly steady, 
ranging between 10 and 14 percent. The figure shows that import tariffs cannot explain the 
magnitude or fluctuation of the observed price gaps. Likewise, no other conventional border 
measures existed that could account for the price gaps and their movement. 
One possible cause of the price gaps is market interventions by regional authorities. As 
discussed earlier, as federal budget subsidies to agriculture fell during the early years of 
transition, regional governments became the main source of budget subsidies. With control of the 
purse strings, regional governments became active in setting agricultural policy within their 
jurisdiction, such that policies became fragmented between regions. The “policies,” however, 
tended to be ad hoc and nontransparent. One common regional policy during transition has been 
fixing price margins between the wholesale and retail level, mainly for food staples such as bread 
and milk. Another common policy, especially for grain, has been restricting product outflows. 
One motive for this policy appears to be concern for local food security during poor harvests. A 
less benign motive might be that local officials wish to profit from the price arbitrage 
opportunities that the flow restrictions create between regions. By affecting prices within 
regions, these policies can affect the price gap (market price support) for commodities. 
Another cause of the price gaps, and especially their fluctuation, does not involve 
agricultural policies – the interaction of poor market infrastructure for agriculture and movement 
in Russia's exchange rate. 
 
Poor infrastructure, the exchange rate, and transmission 
 
When Russia began its economic transition, it inherited from the Soviet Union a deficient system 
of physical infrastructure for agriculture, while the commercial and institutional infrastructure 
that the new market-oriented agro-food economy needed was virtually nonexistent. Poor physical 
                                                                                                                                                             
above border prices, the feed adjustment coefficient measures the tax on livestock producers that occurs because 
they have to pay higher prices for feed.  
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infrastructure involved deficiencies such as weak transportation and storage, while the needed 
commercial and institutional infrastructure involved systems of market information, credit, and 
commercial law (among others). Building the latter from scratch has been one of the country's 
main challenges in its agricultural reform. Wehrheim et al. (2000) concludes that weak 
commercial and institutional infrastructure is the main problem facing the Russian agro-food 
system. 
   Poor infrastructure can have two main effects. The first is that it can result in high 
internal transport/transaction (TT) costs. High TT costs, however, do not explain the fluctuation 
in Russia’s producer NRAs, one reason being that these costs should not change much in the 
short run. Also, in computing the market price support part of PSEs for Russia (which we also 
use in calculating our producer NRAs), OECD subtracts out these costs, making some 
assumptions in doing so. If the adjustment is done sufficiently well, TT costs should not explain 
much of the remaining gap between domestic and border prices. 
  The second effect of poor infrastructure is that it can create the market imperfection of 
incomplete information (Fackler and Goodwin 2001, Barrett 2001, Barrett and Li 2002). In 
particular, producers in isolated areas might be unaware of prices (and especially price 
movements) outside of their region. More specifically, incomplete information can reduce the 
transmission of changes in border prices to domestic prices. Weak market infrastructure can also 
create localized market power by processors and distributors and hold-up problems, such as 
delayed payments to farms which reduce prices (especially when inflation is high -- Gow and 
Swinnen 1998). All these problems can result in gaps between domestic and border prices that 
cannot be explained by either high TT costs or market intervention policies. 
During the transition, Russia's exchange rate has fluctuated considerably (Figure 8).
12 In 
1992, the first year of transition, both the nominal and real exchange rate depreciated 
substantially, as the overvaluation of the Soviet ruble during the planned period was 
(over)corrected. From 1993 to 1997, the ruble appreciated in real terms. Real appreciation 
occurred largely because the inflation rate exceeded the ruble's nominal depreciation rate, 
thereby correcting the ruble’s undervaluation from the exchange rate plunge of 1992. In 1998-99, 
                                                 
12 The exchange rate is measured in U.S. dollars per ruble. Thus, in the figure a rise in its value shows real 
appreciation of the ruble, and a fall real depreciation.  
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the ruble again depreciated strongly in real terms, as a result of Russia's economic crisis that 
hit in August 1998. The cycle continued with the ruble appreciating in real terms during the 
2000s. 
Figure 8 also compares the movement in the ruble's real exchange rate (RER) during 
transition with the fluctuation in the aggregate nominal assistance coefficient (NAC) for 
agricultural producers. The NAC for a commodity equals the sum of the domestic price plus per 
unit budget transfers, divided by the border price. The NAC differs from the NRA in that it does 
not subtract out the border price from the numerator. This means that NAC values cannot be 
negative. A value greater than 1 now indicates assistance for producers, while a value less than 1 
indicates taxation. The fact that NACs cannot be negative means that comparing changes 
between the RER and NAC values is easier than between the RER and NRA values. 
A strong correlation appears to exist between changes in the RER and producer NAC 
values. This correlation could be explained by changes in the RER being only partially 
transmitted to domestic producer prices. The main element (in value terms) in the NAC for most 
Russian commodities is the ratio of the domestic to border price, the latter being the trade price 
in foreign currency converted to domestic currency via the exchange rate. If there were no 
transmission of the change in the exchange rate to domestic prices, the RER and NAC would 
change by the same percentage (ceteris paribus). This apparently came close to occurring in 
1992. If there were complete transmission of the change in the RER to domestic prices, the NAC 
would not change in response to movement in the RER (because both the numerator and 
denominator of the NAC would change by the same percentage). What appears to have happened 
is that changes in the RER have been partially transmitted to domestic prices, such that the RER 
and domestic producer prices move in tandem, but with prices changing by a smaller percentage 
than the RER. 
A qualification to the above arguments is that because the producer NAC contains budget 
transfers in the numerator, their existence would result in the NRAs changing by a smaller 
percentage than the RER (because the transfers would not change in response to change in the 
RER). Figure 8, however, also contains the nominal protection coefficient (NPC) for producers.  
The NPC is the pure ratio of the domestic to border price (unlike the NAC, it contains no budget 
subsidies). The correlation between change in the RER and NPC is as strong as that between the  
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RER and NAC. This shows that transmission from the RER to domestic prices has been far 
from complete. 
The policies and behaviors of regional and local governments could account for some of 
the incomplete transmission, less so Russian federal policies.
13 We mentioned earlier the 
conclusion by Wehrheim et al. (2000) that weak commercial and institutional infrastructure is the 
main problem facing the Russian agro-food economy. This supports the argument that poor 
infrastructure could be the dominant cause of the incomplete transmission, at least during the 
1990s. To some extent, policies and institutional infrastructure are interrelated.  For example, is 
corrupt behavior by officials that affects markets "policy", or is it weak governance and 
institutions?  
Harley (1996), Liefert et al. (1996), the OECD country studies on Russian and Ukrainian 
agriculture (OECD 1998, World Bank and OECD 2004), Shick (2002), Melyukhina (2003), and 
OECD (2007) discuss how the relationship between the exchange rate, market infrastructure, and 
transmission can affect the calculation and interpretation of support for Russia and other 
transition economies. Harley (1996) argues that the effects of poor infrastructure could be 
viewed as a measure not of policy support or taxation, but rather of "policy failure". Liefert et al. 
(1996) argues that the effects can be viewed as part of countries' "systemic legacy" from the 
Soviet period. In computing PSEs for Russia and other transition economies, the OECD 
acknowledges that deficient infrastructure which impedes transmission is a cause of some of the 
estimated "market price support" part of the PSEs.   
Russian regional and local agricultural policies that affect markets are largely ad hoc and 
nontransparent. Eliminating these policy interventions would require fundamental reform of 
Russia's political system, including a transformation of attitudes and behaviors involving 
governance. No overnight policy changes, including any changes that could result from Russia's 
                                                 
13 Figure 8 shows that in 1992 very little of the change in the real exchange rate was transmitted to domestic 
agricultural prices. Although poor infrastructure hindering transmission could account for part of the incomplete 
transmission in that year, policy also played a key role. The negative NRA for 1992 shows that domestic prices were 
below border prices, such that there were incentives to export. Yet, export taxes as high as 70 percent existed for 
most agricultural products, and other export restrictions also existed, such as quotas, licenses, and complete bans 
(OECD 1998, p. 123-124). In its trade policy, Russia was still behaving like a planned rather than a market 
economy, where the emphasis was on keeping product within the country for domestic consumption rather than 
trying to sell abroad. These export controls, however, did not long survive the transition process, and by the mid 
1990s had largely disappeared.  
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accession to the World Trade Organization, would have much effect on regional policy 
interventions in the short to medium term. Also, the incomplete transmission is not mainly the 
result of federal agriculture-targeted policies. Most of the incomplete transmission effect 
therefore involves behaviors and conditions that, at least in the short run, lay beyond the 
influence of Russian federal policymakers. 
An important relationship exists between incomplete transmission (whatever its cause), 
conventional measures of protection and support, and a country’s domestic prices. If the border 
price for a commodity (or more specifically, the world price or exchange rate) changes, and there 
is incomplete transmission of the change to the domestic producer price, then standard measures 
of protection/support will usually move in the opposite direction than will the producer price. 
This relationship has strong implications for interpreting a change in assistance. For most trade 
and support policies, such as import tariffs and quotas and budget subsidies, a positive 
relationship exists between the measured support generated by the policies on the one hand, and 
the producer price, producer welfare, and incentives to produce on the other. For example, if the 
tariff for a commodity rises, both measured support (the price gap, or market price support) and 
the domestic producer price will also rise, such that producers are better off and have incentive to 
increase production. 
Assume, however, that price gaps result mainly from incomplete transmission of changes 
in border prices to domestic prices. In this situation, the expected positive relationship between 
protection/support and domestic prices usually will not hold, rather the relationship will be 
negative.
14 This in turn means that changes in assistance will be inversely related to changes in 
both incentives to produce and producer welfare. 
The following example demonstrates this relationship. Assume that the border and 
domestic producer prices for a commodity initially are identical, such that the nominal protection 
coefficient (NPC) equals 1. The border price then rises. If there is some transmission between the 
border and domestic price, the latter will also increase. If the transmission is incomplete, 
                                                 
14 The negative relationship between changes in support and producer prices with incomplete transmission is most 
easily proven analytically if support is measured by the nominal protection coefficient (because it includes no 
budget subsidies). The negative relationship will hold if the price transmission elasticity between the border and 
domestic price lay between 0 and 1. If the elasticity is either less than 0 or greater than 1, a positive relationship will  
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however, the border price will rise by more than the domestic price. With the producer price 
now below the border price, the NPC drops to less than 1. Incomplete transmission has resulted 
in the NPC and producer price moving in opposite directions. 
The incomplete transmission results in the domestic price changing by a smaller 
percentage than the border price. The domestic price and support measure move in opposite 
directions because the incomplete transmission has a mitigating effect on the move in the 
domestic price. (For further analytical discussion of this relationship, see Liefert and Persaud 
2008). 
This relationship appears to have held during Russia’s transition. Beginning in 1993, high 
domestic inflation exceeded the nominal depreciation of the exchange rate. This meant that the 
ruble appreciated in real terms. By raising the prices of nontradables relative to tradables, the 
inflation reduced real domestic prices for tradable agricultural products.  In Figure 8, the real 
producer prices curve gives the real aggregate price for agricultural goods (indexed for 
convenience to the value of 2 in 1992). The figure shows a major decline in real prices during 
1993-94. The price drop contributed to the large decline in agricultural output during the early 
transition years. 
The change in the real exchange rate, however, was incompletely transmitted to domestic 
prices. This meant that real domestic prices rose relative to border prices (or in other words, 
incomplete transmission meant that producer prices followed domestic inflation to some degree 
rather than just border prices). The gap resulted in measured "support” increasing, despite the 
fact that real producer prices were dropping. The support ensued because incomplete 
transmission entailed real prices not falling by as much as border prices, thereby creating a price 
gap.
 Although inflation eroded real producer prices, incomplete transmission resulted in rising 
producer NRA values, such that calculated assistance became positive in 1994-97 (Figure 8).
 
During Russia’s crisis years of 1998-1999, however, Russian support measures fell, but 
real producer prices rose. Although inflation was high during these crisis years, the severe 
depreciation of the ruble raised nominal agricultural producer prices by more than the inflation 
rate. Thus, real producer prices increased (Figure 8), which motivated more production. (The 
                                                                                                                                                             
exist between a change in the nominal protection coefficient and producer price. These relationships hold whether 
one uses nominal or real values for the border and domestic prices.  
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major depreciation of the ruble during the crisis is considered one of the main reasons why the 
overall Russian economy has grown at a fairly high rate during the 2000s.) Yet, the depreciation 
of the exchange rate was incompletely transmitted to domestic prices. This meant that border 
prices rose by a greater percentage than domestic prices, which in turn moved measures of 
agricultural protection and support in a negative direction. This is shown in Figure 8 by the drop 
in both the nominal assistance and nominal protection coefficients. Measures of 
protection/support and real prices again moved in opposite directions.  
During the early 2000s, measures of support rose again, but real producer prices fell.  
Annual domestic inflation was 10-20 percent, which reduced agricultural real producer prices. 
The inflation also appreciated the ruble in real terms, given that the nominal exchange rate was 
fairly stable. Measures of support increased moderately, indicating incomplete transmission 
between border and domestic prices (that is, domestic prices still followed domestic inflation to 
some degree rather than being wholly determined by border prices). Once again, measures of 
support and real prices moved in opposite directions.
15 
This discussion shows that for Russia during transition, support measures have been 
misleading indicators of the direction of change in incentives to produce and producer welfare. 
The possible negative relationship between measures of protection and support and domestic 
producer prices requires that changes in these measures be interpreted carefully. 
 
Decomposing changes in agricultural producer prices 
 
Liefert (2007) has developed a method for decomposing changes in agricultural producer prices 
within countries. The method allows one to measure the degree to which changes in all of the 
following affect prices, and thereby producer incentives: (1) world prices; (2) the exchange rate, 
which represents macroeconomic policy; (3) transparent commodity-specific trade policy (such 
as import tariffs); and (4) incomplete transmission caused by either nontransparent policies or 
poor market infrastructure. We use this method to examine changes in Russian producer prices 
                                                 
15 If we added to Figure 8 the aggregate annual percent PSEs for Russian agriculture for the 1990s as computed by 
OECD, we again would get a generally negative relationship between the change in the percent PSE and real 





d be a commodity's domestic producer price, P
w the world price in foreign currency, 
E the exchange rate, and t an import/export tax.  If domestic transport/transaction costs have 
been subtracted out, markets within the country work well, and no market-distorting policies 
exist, P
d = P
w * E.  Any deviation of P
d from this value could be considered a distortion. If a 
trade tax exists, P
d = P
w * E * (1 + t), where the right side term is called the tariff-included 
landed price. The decomposition method measures the degree to which a change in P
d can be 
attributed to changes in the three right-side variables. 
Table 5 gives decomposition results for various commodities. The periods over which the 
decomposition calculations are made were chosen mainly to coincide with movement in the 
exchange rate: (1) major appreciation of the ruble over 1994-97; (2) severe depreciation in 1998-
99; and (3) little change over 2001-02/03, to provide examples in a more tranquil time. Before 
examining the general results, we will demonstrate the decomposition procedure, using the 
results for wheat over 1994-97. Columns 1, 2, and 4 present the change in the real world price (in 
foreign currency), real exchange rate, and real producer price for each commodity over the 
period. Given that the exchange rate is expressed as rubles per dollar, the 56 percent fall in the 
rate over 1994-97 shows that the ruble appreciated substantially in real terms. Column 3 gives 
the price transmission elasticity between the change in the commodity's landed price [P
w * E (1 + 
t)] and its domestic producer price, in this example a very low 6 percent.
16 
Columns 5 and 6 are based on the assumption that transmission between the landed and 
domestic price is complete (the transmission elasticity equals 1). Based on this assumption, the 
direct price effect measures the contribution that the changes in P
w and E make to the change in 
P
d. In the wheat example, ΔP
w and ΔE result in P
d falling by 39 percent. The tariff effect 
measures the effect on P
d of a change in the tariff, as well as the implicit effect of the tariff on P
d 
that results from changes in P
w and E interacting with the existing tariff. In this example, the total 
tariff effect is to increase P
d by 2 percent. Column 7 measures the sum of the direct price and 
tariff effects. It shows that if transmission between the landed price and P
d were complete, the 
                                                 
16 The price transmission elasticities identified in Table 5 are not econometrically estimated. Rather, the values are 
computed as simply the ratio of the percent change in the domestic producer price to the percent change in the 
landed price for each commodity over the specific period of calculation. The elasticities are thereby "implicit" in the 
price changes over the period in question.  
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combined and interactive changes in P
w, E, and t would decrease P
d by 37 percent. 
Column 8 measures the incomplete transmission effect on P
d. In the wheat example, P
d 
would fall by 37 percent with complete transmission, but because of incomplete transmission, 
the drop is only 2 percent. The incomplete transmission prevents the other 35 percent potential 
decline from occurring, which means the incomplete transmission effect is +35 percent. The net 
effect in column 9 is the sum of the combined and incomplete transmission effects, and gives the 
actual change in P
d. Using again the example of wheat over 1994-97, the appendix provides a 
deeper examination of the decomposition method and results. 
Table 5 shows that the real exchange rate moved much more strongly during the 1990s 
than world prices (though changes in the latter were also nontrivial), such that the exchange rate 
was the dominant variable driving changes in domestic producer prices. The tariff effects are not 
large, which reflects the general stability of agricultural tariff rates from the beginning of 
transition through the early 2000s. Most of the tariff effect comes from changes in world prices 
and the exchange rate interacting with existing tariff rates, rather than from changes in the rates 
themselves. The incomplete transmission effects, on the other hand, are very big. In many cases, 
less than half of the potential change in the producer price occurs because of incomplete 
transmission, and in a number of cases the transmission is negative, with landed prices and 
producer prices moving in opposite directions. 
 
Producer assistance in the 2000s 
 
The preceding discussion of assistance and price gaps for agricultural producers focused on the 
main trends since transition. The following discussion examines assistance in the more recent 
period since 2000, with more attention on specific commodities. Although changes in border 
prices (especially the exchange rate) combined with incomplete transmission likely accounts for 
some of the price gaps and measured assistance during the 2000s, our discussion will focus on 
the effects of agriculture-targeted policies. 
Table 2 shows that since 2000, aggregate assistance to producers has been positive to a 
nontrivial degree, with the aggregate annual NRA between about 15 and 25 percent. Table 3 
shows, however, that the aggregate NRA masks considerable differences in support/taxation  
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between commodities. In the 2000s, livestock products (meat and milk) and sugar have been 
heavily assisted, while grain and sunflowerseed, Russia’s dominantly produced and traded 
oilseed, have been generally taxed. 
Of Russia’s major agricultural commodities, sunflowerseed has been the most consistent 
net export during the transition period (Table 4). In 2000, Russia imposed a 20 percent export tax 
on the commodity. The tax can explain the negative NRA in 2002-03 of 22 percent, though not 
the NRA values for 2001, 2004, and 2005 of 2, 9, and -2 percent, respectively. 
During the 2000s, grain is also generally taxed, especially in 2002-03, with the aggregate 
grain NRA in 2002 being negative 29 percent. One reason for the negative values involves the 
interaction of weather and infrastructure. Both 2001 and 2002 were good weather years, resulting 
in big grain harvests. Although this resulted in large exports, mainly through Black Sea ports, the 
infrastructure (including port export capacity) had difficulty handling the movement of so much 
production. Better infrastructure would probably have allowed higher exports. The surplus 
product drove domestic prices down (though with some lag). The ensuing drop in prices resulted 
in "taxation” vis-à-vis border prices, even after adjusting for domestic transport and transaction 
costs. 
Livestock production in the 2000s, and especially meat, has been heavily assisted (with 
the exception of eggs). One reason is that since grain and sunflowerseed are used to produce 
animal feed for livestock production, the taxation of the former that results from domestic prices 
being below border prices results in a subsidy for the latter. In computing market price support 
for livestock products, the OECD incorporates this subsidy, which means that we also 
incorporate it into our NRA calculations. 
Table 4 shows that in the 2000s (as well as most of the transition period), Russia has been 
a large net importer of livestock products, especially meat. In 2003, the Russian government 
created restrictive tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for imports of beef and pork and a pure quota for 
poultry. The annual quota for poultry was set at 1.05 million metric tons (mt), and the low tariff 
quota for beef and pork at 0.447 and 0.45 mt, respectively. In comparison, 2002 poultry, beef, 
and pork imports equaled 1.37, 0.50, and 0.60 million tons, respectively (according to USDA 
data). The low in-quota tariff for beef and pork was kept at the previous tariff rate of 15 percent, 
while the out of-quota tariffs were set at 60 and 80 percent, respectively. The tariff for the quota  
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poultry imports was maintained at the existing 25 percent level. In 2005-06, the government 
liberalized the meat import policy moderately, mainly by converting the pure quota for poultry to 
a TRQ. Also, for all three meats, the low tariff quota was to rise gradually from 2006 to 2009, 
and the out of-quota tariff to fall gradually. 
Although the meat import TRQs (and poultry pure quota) created in 2003 contributed 
strongly to market price support, the assistance rates for meat were high in preceding years as 
well. One explanation specific to poultry is that in 2001 the Russian government began to restrict 
imports from the United States, the dominant foreign supplier, on sanitary grounds. This helps 
explain the big jump in the poultry NRA from 51 percent in 2000 to 110 percent in 2001, which 
helped drive up the calculated NRA for total meat (Figure 4 and Appendix Table 2). 
Another product which has been highly supported since the late 1990s is sugar. Russia's 
sugar trade policy has been complicated, involving different import rates depending on the 
exporting country, and a tariff-free import quota from Ukraine from 1997 to 2004 (OECD 1999, 
p.183). The policy's overall effect in the 2000s, though, has been strong support. 
 
Indirect assistance for producers and the relative rate of assistance 
 
We next examine indirect assistance/taxation for agricultural producers during the transition 
period that results from tariffs for other imported goods. Import tariffs for nonagricultural 
tradables hurt agricultural producers by raising domestic prices for the tariffied goods, which in 
turn bids up prices for inputs used by both agricultural and nonagricultural products. But, more 
importantly, they bid up and attract mobile resources out of the agricultural sector, so reducing 
rewards from farming. 
The bottom rows of Table 2 give information needed to compute the relative rate of 
assistance for agricultural producers during the transition years, and provide the values for Figure 
9. The NRA for tradable non-agriculture (the row “All non-agriculture” in Table 2) is based on 
import tariffs for non-agricultural products. We use that trade-weighted average tariff as a proxy 
for the nominal rate of assistance to the tradable non-agricultural part of the economy (including  
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the processed food industry),
17 call it NRAnonag
t. Together with the NRAag
t we are then able 
to calculate a Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA, defined as: 
RRA = 100[(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) – 1] 
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the NRA cannot be less than -100 
percent if producers are to earn anything, so too must the RRA. This measure is useful. If it is 
below zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to which the policy 
regime has an anti-agricultural bias, and conversely when the RRA is positive. Given the 
steadiness of the NRA for tradable non-agriculture, the RRA follows the fluctuation in the NRA 
for tradable agriculture. During the first half of the 2000s, assistance to agriculture was 
somewhat higher than to the rest of the tradable economy, resulting in a moderate relative 
assistance rate of around 5-15 percent. 
 
Assistance to consumers 
 
Recall that during the planned period, the final consumers of agro-food products were supported.  
Large subsidies to food processors allowed consumers to pay food retail prices below domestic 
production costs, as well as below border prices. During the early years of transition these 
subsidies were phased out, and by 2000 were nonexistent. Recall also that OECD’s CSEs for 
Russian agriculture cover the effect from only farm level policies. However, given that consumer 
subsidies largely did not exist during the transition period, consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) 
computed from OECD’s CSEs become a strong measure of assistance/taxation not just at the 
farm level, but also at the retail level. 
For consumers, a positive CTE for a commodity indicates taxation (because the consumer 
price exceeds the border price), and a negative CTE support. Comparing Figure 10 with Figure 4 
shows that the CTEs generally follow the producer NRAs, the main difference being that 
producers continued to receive budget subsidies to some degree during transition. Although 
                                                 
17 This would be an overstatement if exporting and non-trading parts of the non-agricultural sectors receive less 
support than the import-competing parts; but it is assumed that non-tariff import barriers are still in place and 
exactly offset this bias.   
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CTEs for most agricultural products were already negative in the planned period (see again 
Figure 1), the CTEs fell substantially with the beginning of reform in 1992, resulting in large 
support. The rise in the CTEs over 1993-97 led to moderate taxation (in the aggregate), the drop 
in 1998-99 (coinciding with Russia’s economic crisis) eliminated the taxation, and the rebound 
in the CTEs in the 2000s resulted again in moderate aggregate taxation (see Appendix Table 3 
for the detailed CTE calculations). 
Although the aggregate CTE in 2005 was 8 percent, the CTEs for grain and 
sunflowerseed were negative, those for meat and sugar highly positive, and for milk slightly 
positive (although much higher in previous years). Negative grain and sunflowerseed producer 
NRAs and CTEs indicate that producers were taxed to the benefit of consumers, including 
livestock producers who used animal feed.  Likewise, the positive meat, milk, and sugar 
producer NRAs and CTEs indicate that consumers of these products were taxed to the benefit of 
producers. 
Given that direct consumer subsidies during transition have been almost nil, the CTEs are 
determined almost completely by the relationship between domestic and border prices. The main 
cause of change in assistance/taxation for consumers is therefore the same as for producers − 
fluctuation in the exchange rate combined with incomplete transmission to domestic prices. 
 
 
Future policy direction and political economy analysis 
 
 
During most of the transition period, Russia’s assistance policies for agriculture have not been 
extreme. Budget transfers have been low. The main border measure has been tariffs, which from 
the early 1990s to the early 2000s annually averaged 10-15 percent. The major exceptions to 
these moderate policies have been the special protectionist policy for sugar, the 20 percent export 
tax imposed on sunflowerseed in 2000, and the restrictive tariff rate quotas for imports of beef 
and pork, and pure quota for poultry, created in 2003 (recently also converted to a TRQ). 
Russian budgetary support to agriculture fell during the initial transition years not 
because of the government’s desire to reduce support, but rather because funding was tight.  
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Since 2000, however, government revenues have been rising substantially, for two reasons. 
The first is that GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 6-7 percent (PlanEcon). The second 
is that the bulk of Russia’s export earnings come from energy (crude oil, oil products, natural 
gas), which have surged because of the rise in world energy prices in recent years. 
Despite the government’s improving financial condition, from 2000 to 2005 budget 
subsidies to agriculture increased only slightly (in Euro values). In 2005, however, the Russian 
government designated the following areas as National Priority Projects which would receive 
increased funding − health, education, housing, and agriculture. Although specific figures are not 
yet available, budgetary support to agriculture since 2005 has risen to reflect this priority status, 
and should continue to do so (Interfax). The government has also stated that the main goal of 
agricultural policy will be to revive the livestock sector. The government apparently wishes to 
reverse the large drop in production, and surge in imports, of livestock products that has occurred 
during transition. 
Russia officially began its bid for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1995 (to the GATT in 1993), and has concluded bilateral negotiations with almost all countries 
(including the United States and EU). How might accession constrain Russia’s future agricultural 
policy? We examine the question with respect to the three main “pillars” of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture − market access, export subsidies, and domestic support. Russia’s 
“current” negotiating positions with respect to export subsidies and domestic support as 
identified in this chapter are from the English-language website Russia and WTO 
(www.wto.ru/russia.asp), while the bargaining position concerning market access is from OECD 
(2002, p. 44).  
  Russia’s existing behavior with respect to all three Uruguay Round pillars is relatively 
moderate (the main exception being its meat import tariff rate quotas). Thus, in all areas, Russia 
in its accession negotiations is asking for bound commitments above its current levels. The 
aggregate trade-weighted tariff for agro-food products in 2003 was 10 percent.  In comparison, 
the average bound tariff on agricultural products for WTO members exceeds 60 percent (Whitley 
et al. 2001).
18 As of 2002, Russia was asking for an initial average bound tariff of 35 percent, to 
                                                 
18 This comparison overstates tariffs for WTO members relative to Russia’s tariffs. The +60 percent figure for WTO 
members is a simple average of bound tariffs, while the Russian tariff figure of 10 percent is a trade-weighted  
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fall over six years to an average of 25 percent.
19 Although Russia has not used any agricultural 
export subsidies during the transition period, and many countries in the current Doha Round of 
trade negotiations want to ban such subsidies altogether, it is asking for annual bound export 
subsidies of $0.7 billion. On domestic support, Russia is asking for annual bound support of $9.5 
billion, which compares to its 2004 actual support level of $2.73 billion (Rosstat 2004, pp. 
606).
20 
  Although WTO members have resisted Russia’s requests, with respect to tariffs and 
domestic support the final negotiated levels could lay somewhere between Russia’s current 
behaviors and the bound levels it is requesting. If so, Russia’s accession would not liberalize its 
agricultural policies (just as any reduction of countries’ bound levels in the Doha Round that 
leaves these levels above current behaviors would not liberalize their trade). Russia would 
thereby have license to increase actual support and protection for agricultural producers. Yet, the 
negotiated bound levels would provide limits to future Russian support and protection. 
  We mentioned before that in the early 2000s Russia used health (sanitary) arguments to 
ban imports of U.S. poultry. By 2005, Russia was using sanitary arguments to ban meat imports 
on an ad hoc basis from many other countries as well (such as Canada, Brazil, France, Denmark, 
Poland, Romania, and Mongolia). This raises the concern that the country might be increasingly 
using sanitary issues as a protectionist pretext. Thus, the main benefit of Russia's accession to 
other WTO members might be that it would give them an official forum for challenging the 
country’s sanitary and phytosanitary-based import restrictions. 
  We now examine political economy considerations behind Russian agricultural policy 
during the transition period. Before doing so, it would be helpful to reidentify the main types of 
producers: the former state and collective farms, family farms, and household plots.
21 
                                                                                                                                                             
average. The WTO member tariff calculation based on bound tariffs ignores products for which no tariff exists, 
while Russia’s trade-weighted aggregate tariff covers all products, and assigns a tariff value of 0 for goods for which 
there is no tariff. An agricultural trade-weighted tariff computed for all WTO members would therefore be lower 
than the figure computed in Whitley et al. Nonetheless, the large disparity between the +60 and 10 percent figures 
indicates that agricultural tariffs in WTO members in the aggregate are high relative to Russia’s tariffs. 
19 This is the latest publicly-available information we could find concerning Russia’s bargaining position on 
agricultural import tariffs (OECD 2002, p. 44). 
20 Karlova (2005) examines the effects on Russian agriculture of various policy liberalization scenarios, some 
related to WTO accession. 
21 A fourth type of producer has arisen in the 2000s, the "new operators” (Rylko and Jolly 2005, Uzun 2005). These 
are large vertically integrated enterprises which combine primary production, processing, distribution, and  
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The transition process created fundamental problems for policymakers (both federal 
and regional) which had no simple solution. The main problem is that agriculture in the planned 
period overproduced relative both to the economy's real income and consumer purchasing power 
and to its comparative advantage vis-à-vis the world market. Correcting these imbalances would 
require shutting down unprofitable farms and in particular shedding unproductive labor. An 
aggressive policy along these lines, however, could create large-scale rural unemployment, 
especially given the limited opportunities for alternative employment in rural areas and 
impediments to labor mobility within the country (such as cities like Moscow establishing 
official hurdles to relocation). One could in fact argue that the main economic challenge of 
transition, not just for agriculture but economy-wide, has been reallocating labor from old to new 
viable employment, while avoiding serious unemployment.
 
The main policy response has been to minimize rural unemployment by shielding the 
large former state and collective farms from termination (though governmental bodies have had 
limited resources to pursue this policy). Given that most farms have been unprofitable during the 
transition period, the main discretionary policy used to avoid farm bankruptcies has been soft 
loans from state or parastatal lenders with periodic debt write-off. Labor has not been forced out 
of agriculture, but rather been given the choice of seeking alternate employment.
22 A secondary 
motive for preserving farms could be local food security, especially given the deficient market 
infrastructure that works to segment regional markets from each other. 
Within this overall policy context, one can examine other more specific political 
economy motives behind policies. The analysis is based on the conclusion that Russia's 
restrictive meat import TRQ regime created in 2003, and the decision in 2005 to increase funding 
for agriculture, helping especially the livestock sector, show that support for agriculture in 
                                                                                                                                                             
sometimes retail sale. They are not mutually exclusive from the former state and collective farms, in that an 
enterprise typically contains a number of these farms. 
22 Although workers in general have not been completely forced off of farms, Bogdanovskii (2005) finds that for 
many farms and their workers a compromise arrangement of limited detachment has been made. Millions of workers 
and their families have become subsistence producers, in that they no longer work on and receive wages from the 
farms, but are left to live off their household plots. The workers, however, still receive some benefits from their 
former employing farm, such as continued access to its social-welfare services (health, education, housing) and use 
of the farm as a conduit for inputs for plot use. Many of these subsistence farmers are elderly or past their prime 
working years. For the rest, such a grim life provides strong motivation to find an alternative. This is the apparent 




general, and the livestock sector in particular, is on the rise. One political economy hypothesis 
is that commodities which have low or declining comparative advantage receive support. 
Russia's agricultural trade patterns during transition, as well as work by Liefert (2002), indicate 
that Russia has a comparative advantage in producing grain and sunflowerseed, and a 
comparative disadvantage in livestock products and sugar. Yet, NRAs for the 2000s show that 
policy and market conditions combine to tax the former and assist the latter. Specific border 
measures have taxed sunflowerseed (export tax) and supported meat (import TRQs) and sugar (a 
complex policy involving varying tariff rates). The government's announcement that additional 
funding for agriculture will favor the livestock sector is further evidence that Russia is more 
interested in reviving this sector than in capitalizing on its potential as a bulk crop exporter. 
Another political economy hypothesis is that agriculture will be supported the more farm 
incomes fall relative to the rest of the economy. In 1990, average monthly earnings by 
agricultural workers equaled 95 percent of economy-wide earnings, but by 2003 the figure had 
dropped to 39 percent (Rosstat 2004, p. 180). The assistance-increasing budget and border 
policies of the 2000s support this hypothesis. 
The two preceding hypotheses concern the "neediness" of agriculture for special 
assistance, and are consistent with the neediness policy of supporting agriculture to avoid major 
rural unemployment. The following two hypotheses involve the cost of support. The first is that 
as agriculture's share in GDP and employment falls, support rises. This is because with fewer 
farmers to support, assistance becomes more affordable.  During transition, agriculture's share in 
GDP has fallen substantially, from about 13 percent in 1990 to 4.6 percent in 2003 (see Table 1). 
Agricultural employment has fallen less, from 13 percent in 1990 to 11 percent in 2003. The 
larger drop in GDP compared to employment shows that labor productivity in agriculture has 
declined relative to the rest of the economy, with negative consequences for farm profitability. 
Thus, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that falling farm employment is motivating 
more support by making it more affordable. Rather, falling labor productivity raises the specter 
of unemployment, which buttresses the neediness argument for farm support. 
The second cost-related hypothesis is that an inverse relationship exists between the share 
of food in consumer expenditure and support to agricultural producers. The smaller the share, the 
less that support policies which affect prices will tax consumers. From 1990 to 1999, the share of  
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home food consumption in expenditure rose from 32 to 52 percent. By 2004, however, the 
share had dropped back to 36 percent (reflecting mainly growth in consumer income -- Rosstat 
2005, p. 226). The government's decision in the 2000s to increase border protection and budget 
transfers for livestock producers is therefore consistent with this hypothesis. Russia appears to be 
following the path of many other countries in that as agricultural commodities become "import-
challenged," the economy's ability to afford agricultural subsidies rises, and consumers feel less 
of the tax they pay for support to producers, assistance increases. 
Russian officials might be tempted to use the increased funding to agriculture to expand 
production, defend existing farms from liquidation, and protect current levels of employment. 
Pursuing such goals would largely freeze the structure of resource use in agriculture, but not 
necessarily motivate the changes in farm management and resource use to raise productivity. An 
alternative goal would be to use funding to promote productivity growth, which would improve 
Russian farms’ ability to compete with imports, or to export on to global markets. 
Productivity growth, especially of the labor-saving type, would require the continued exit 
of unskilled labor from farms, and the termination of chronically unprofitable farms. To mitigate 
the ensuing social costs, the Russian government could adopt the following policies. First, it 
could speed-up the transfer of responsibility for providing social-welfare services for workers ─ 
health, education, housing, recreation ─ from the large farms to local governments. This would 
mean that workers who leave farms would not immediately lose access to these necessary 
services (as well as relieve the farms of this financial burden). Second, subsistence farmers who 
work only their household plots could be given the legal status of “economically employed,” 
which would give them the rights to pensions, medical insurance, unemployment benefits, and 
other forms of social protection. Third, to increase rural employment opportunities, the 
government could promote the growth of small businesses through credit facilities, tax breaks, 
and simplified administrative requirements for creating small businesses. Fourth, governmental 
bodies throughout the country could remove whatever official impediments exist to labor 
mobility. 
Although many farms continue to have a surplus of older and unskilled workers, many 
also suffer from a shortage of skilled workers (Liefert et al. 2005). A disproportionate share of 
the labor migration out of agriculture during the transition period has come from younger and  
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better-educated workers. Increased funding for agriculture could be used to attract and train 
workers in such deficit skills as machinery use and repair, animal care (including knowledge of 
modern breeding and feeding practices and veterinary care), and low to middle-level 
management activities. Such policies could increase productivity by substituting human capital 
for unskilled labor. 
A last policy-relevant observation is that much of this paper has focused on the argument 
that a major cause of price gaps in Russian agriculture has been the incomplete transmission of 
changes in border prices, and especially the exchange rate, to domestic producer prices, and 
where the incomplete transmission is not caused mainly by agriculture-targeted policies, but 
rather by weak infrastructure. State investment in improving infrastructure, both hard (physical) 
and soft (institutional), would reduce high transport and transaction costs, and also improve 
transmission between border and domestic prices. Improving infrastructure takes time, effort, 
and expense. In the long run, however, strengthening macroeconomic stability and improving 
domestic infrastructure might do as much or more to reduce price gaps and their distorting 
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World Bank.  Table 1: Importance of the agro-food sector in Russia’s economy, 1990 and 2003 
                                                                         (percent) 
        
     1990  2003 
_________________________________________________________ 
        
                 
GDP        
   Primary agriculture    13.2   4.6 
   Food processing
1 na   2.8 
        
Employment        
   Primary agriculture    13.2   11.0 
   Food processing  2.1   2.3 
        
Trade
2        
   Exports     2.1   2.1 
   Imports      20.3   21.6 
__________________________________________________________ 
        
 
1Figure for 2003 is based on assumption that the share of the food processing industry     
in the value of total industrial output and in value added by all industry are equal.  
2Figures give the share of primary agriculture plus food processing industry in total exports and 
imports.    
        
Source: Goskomstat/Rosstat and Russian Customs Committee.   Table 2: Nominal and relative rates of assistance for agricultural producers, Russia, 1992 to 2005 
                                                                                                   (percent) 
                               
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005                
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                               
                               
Covered 
products
1,2  -48 -27  -8 14 23 38 19 -3 0 13  16 11 22 17                
Non-covered 
products  -48 -27  -8 14 23 38 19 -3 0 13  16 11 22 17                
All agricultural 
products










-45 -20  9 24 29 42 26 1 3 17  19 14 25 20                
Importables
2,3 -48  -27  -7 19 25 44 22 -2 2 27 43 23 32 26                
Exportables
2,3  -50 -26 -11 -24 -22 -6 -30 -10 -22 -14 -29 -16 0 -4                
Tradables                      
All 
agriculture
2,3  -45 -20  9 24 29 42 26 1 3 17  19 14 25 20                
All non-
agriculture  2 8 9 9 10 12 12 12 12 9 9 9 9 9                
RRA
4  -46 -25  -1 14 17 27 13 -10 -7 7  9 4 15 10                
1 Products for which individual NRAs are computed. 
2 NRA including product-specific input subsidies. 
3 NRA including other (decoupled and non-product-specific) subsidies. 
4 The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag
t)/(100+NRAnonag
t) - 100], where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the average percentage 
NRAs for the tradables part of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.     
               




Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance for agricultural producers, by commodity, Russia, 1992 to 2005   
                                                                                                      (percent)   
      
Commodity 1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Importables      
Pork -70  -11  20 32 27 46 46 39 3  46 59 31 42 72
Beef -73  -50  -42 -30 -8 51 0 -19 18  48 72 47 20 15
Poultry -57  -9  27 49 55 71 31 12 51  110 73 46 79 114
Milk -55  -29  -3 63 63 79 52 24 11  9 40 43 40 10
White sugar  16  96  65 63 93 105 88 7 22  42 71 85 98 64
Corn -34  -3  95 47 62 43 12 -14 9  35 -19 -14 -24 -29
Mixed Trade Status      
Eggs -64  -38  10 50 31 46 29 6 -17  -1 -8 -32 5 7
Sunflowerseed -40  -51  -17 -6 -22 -26 -30 -33 -34  2 -22 -22 9 -2
Rye -25  -29  1 25 38 27 -12 -23 30  -8 -44 -41 11 -5
Oats -32  -28  -12 -16 28 16 -5 -33 -7  -38 -66 -57 -29 -21
Barley   6  -14  -12 -37 -2 0 -10 -41 -16  -17 -25 -22 -12 -4
Wheat -46  -20  -11 -11 5 7 -21 -28 -21  -10 -21 -8 3 -5
      
Importables -48  -27  -7 19 25 44 22 -2 2  27 43 23 32 26
Exportables -50  -26  -11 -24 -22 -6 -30 -10 -22  -14 -29 -16 0 -4
      
Weighted Average 
of above  -48 -27  -8 14 23 38 19 -3 0  13 16 11 22 17
      
Standard Deviation  30  40  42 37 35 37 35 26 25  41 51 44 39 43




Share of above 
products in total 




77 72 63 62 63 65 59 59 61 65 62 60 64 65              
                    
1 Share is calculated in terms of undistorted prices. 
Source: Calculated from data from OECD and own calculations. Table 4: Russian agricultural trade, 1992 to 2004   
______________________________________________________
        
   1992-1995  1996-2000 2001-2004
______________________________________________________
    
      billion U.S. dollars 
Agro-food trade
 1      
 Imports  12.39  9.81 10.35
 Exports  1.17  1.17 1.87
 Balance  -11.22  -8.64 -8.48
        
         million tons 
Commodity trade balance     
 Grain  -12.05  -3.08 6.56
 Sunflowerseed  0.34  1.06 0.18
 White  sugar  -3.80  -4.21 -4.17
 Meat  -1.03  -1.67 -2.48
 Milk  -1.57  -1.33 -1.51
______________________________________________________
        
Note: Figures give average annual values over the period. Figures for 
commodities give average annual trade balance.  Positive values indicate net 
exports and negative values net imports. 
1 Covers primary agriculture and processed products. 
Source: FAO.       Table 5: Changes in Russian real agricultural producer prices, 1994 to 2002                   
   World    Exchange  Price    Producer 
Direct 
price  Tariff Combined 
Incomplete 
transmission  Net 
   price
1   rate 
transmission 
elasticity
2  price effect  effect effect  effect  effect 
    (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7 = 5 + 6)  (8) 
  (9 = 7 + 8 =
4) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                  
1994-97               percent change              
                                  
Wheat   37 -56 6 -2  -39 2 -37 35 -2   
Sunflowerseed  -4 -56 87 -50  -58 0 -58 8 -50   
Beef   -25 -56 -38 25  -61 -3 -64 89 25   
Pork   25 -56 -8 3  -42 1 -41 44 3   
Poultry   20 -56 -9 4  -41 -1 -42 46 4   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
        
1997-99       
       
Wheat   -19 138 39 33  88 -3 85 -52 33   
Sunflowerseed  -5 138 105 112  128 -22 106 6 112   
Beef   9 138 29 41  139 4 143 -102 41   
Pork
3   -5 67 13 5  50 -3 47 -42 5   
Poultry   -16 138 37 29  77 -1 76 -47 29   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
        
2001-02       
       
Wheat
4   -8 6 61 -2  -3 0 -3 1 -2   
Sunflowerseed  22 1 -14 -3  31 -6 25 -28 -3   
Beef   -18 1 30 -5  -15 -- -15 10 -5   
Pork   -15 1 79 -10  -13 -- -13 3 -10   
Poultry   14 1 -49 -6  11 -- 11 -17 -6   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                  
Note: Columns 1, 2, and 4 give the percent change in the variable over the period. The values in columns 5-7 are based on the assumption of complete transmission between  
 
46
the landed price and producer price. The net effect column (9) gives the net effect on the producer price, and therefore has exactly the same value as column 4.   
 -- means insignificant change.                               
1In  foreign  currency.                                 
2Gives the transmission elasticity between the landed and producer price.                           
3Computed  for  1997-2000.                                 
4 Computed for 2001-03.                                     
































Note: The NRA and CTE are expressed as the percentage by which undistorted prices have been altered by agro-food policies. 
Aggregate values are based on assumption that NRA (CTE) calculated from commodities for which Cook et al. compute PSEs (CSEs) 
gives aggregate NRA (CTE) for those commodities for which Cook et al. do not compute PSEs (CSEs).  
Source: Calculated from data from Cook Liefert and Koopman (1991).  
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1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Crops Livestock products
Processed food Industrial output less food industry
Services
 
Note: For livestock products, processed food, and industrial output, 1990 = 100; for crops, average annual output over 1989-91 = 100; 
for services, 1991 = 100. 
Source: Goskomstat and PlanEcon.  
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Source: Authors’ calculated based on data from the OECD.  
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Grain Sunflowerseed White sugar Meat Milk
 
Source: Authors’ calculated based on data from the OECD.  
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Importables Exportables Weighted average of both
 
Source: Authors’ calculated based on data from the OECD.  
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Market price support Output subsidies Input subsidies Other
 
Source: Authors’ calculated based on data from the OECD.  
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% Price gap Average tariff
 
Source: Price gaps calculated by authors from data from OECD, tariff data obtained directly from World Bank WITS.  
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1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Real exchange rate
Producer nominal assistance coefficient
Producer nominal protection coefficient
Real producer prices
 
Note: Real exchange rate indexed to value of producer nominal assistance coefficient in 1991. Real producer prices indexed to value of 2 in 1992. 
Source: For real exchange rate, PlanEcon and Fed Reserve/Haver Analytics. Coefficients of assistance and protection and real producer prices 
calculated by authors from data from OECD and PlanEcon.  
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Total agriculture NRA Total non-agriculture NRA Relative rate of assistance
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from OECD and World Bank.  
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Grain Sunflowerseed White sugar Meat Milk Aggregate
 
Note: Aggregate CTE values are based on the assumption that the CTE calculated from commodities for which OECD computes 
market price support is the same as the CTE for those commodities for which OECD does not compute market price support. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from OECD. Appendix: Decomposing changes in agricultural producer prices 
 
Using again the example of the Russian wheat market over 1994-97, this appendix examines 
Liefert's procedure for decomposing changes in producer prices in greater detail than in the text.  
Appendix Table 1 presents the results. The main additional information added compared to Table 





V gives the percent change in P
d and the variables that determine P
d (all in 
real terms) over the decomposition period. The tariff on wheat imports rose from 1 to 5 percent, 
which accounts for the 400 percent increase in the tariff rate. The direct price, tariff, and 
combined effect columns are all based on the assumption that transmission of the change in the 
landed price to producer price is complete. Through the direct price effect, the rise in the world 
price (P
w) increases P
d by 26 percent, while the drop in the exchange rate (E) decreases P
d by 65 
percent. The aggregate direct price effect is to reduce P
d 39 percent. 
The rise in the tariff rate has the explicit tariff effect of increasing P
d 3 percent. By 
interacting with the tariff, the changes in P
w and E have implicit tariff effects on P
d. The rise in 
P
w has the implicit effect of increasing P
d by 1 percent, while the drop in E has the implicit effect 
of decreasing P
d 2 percent (because the rate is still so low). The aggregate tariff effect is a rise in 
P
d of 2 percent. The combined effect of changes in all variables if transmission were complete is 
to reduce P
d 37 percent. 
If transmission were complete, the rise in P
w would have the attributable effect of 
increasing P
d 27 percent. However, the incomplete transmission effect column shows that only 2 
percent of this potential rise was realized. The failure of P
d to rise by the potential maximum 
because of incomplete transmission has the attributable effect of lowering P
d by 25 percent. The 
same analysis applies to the incomplete transmission effects associated with the changes in the 
exchange rate and tariff. The aggregate incomplete transmission effect is a rise in P
d of 35 
percent. The net effect is the same as in Table 5 in the text, except that the net contribution of the 
change in each variable to the change in P
d is identified. For example, the net effect of the drop 
in the exchange rate is to reduce P
d by 4 percent. 
Appendix Table 1 shows that the full decomposition is a matrix. The columns identify 
and measure economic reasons why P




effects. The rows measure the contribution that changes in specific variables have on P
d, with 
respect to each of the column effects, and in the aggregate.  
Appendix Table 1: Decomposition of change in producer price for Russian wheat, 1994-97 
 
Contribution of  
•
V  to 
•
d P  















                                                                          percent 
World price   37         26           1           27             -25        2 
Exchange rate   -56         -65          -2       -67               63       -4 
Tariff rate  400          na              3         3               -3        -- 
 
Producer price     -2         -39          2       -37               35     -2 
 
Note: na means not applicable. 
1 Assumes complete transmission between landed and producer price. 
Source: For  
•
V , database for Russian PSEs (OECD) and PlanEcon for price indices used to convert from nominal prices and 
exchange rate to real values. For contribution of 
•
V  to 
•
d P , authors’ own calculations. 
  
Appendix Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to farmers, Russia, 1992 to 2004          
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                  
Commodity 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                  
                   percent        
                  
Grain -29 -20 -9 -14 9 9 -16 -30 -15 -14 -29 
   Wheat  -46 -20 -11 -11 5 7 -21 -28 -21 -10 -21 
   Corn  -34 -3 95 47 62 43 12 -14 9 35 -19 
   Barley  6 -14 -12 -37 -2 -- -10 -41 -16 -17 -25 
   Rye  -25 -29 1 25 38 27 -12 -23 30 -8 -44 
   Oats  -32 -28 -12 -16 28 16 -5 -33 -7 -38 -66 
Sunflowerseed -40 -51 -17 -6 -22 -26 -30 -33 -34 2 -22 
White sugar  16 96 65 63 93 105 88 7 22 42 71 
                  
Meat -69 -32 -16 -2 11 52 19 4 17 57 67 
   Beef  -73 -50 -42 -30 -8 51           --  -19 18 48 72 
   Pork  -70 -11 20 32 27 46 46 39 3 46 59 
   Poultry  -57 -9 27 49 55 71 31 12 51 110 73 
Milk -55 -29 -3 63 63 79 52 24 11 9 40 
Eggs -64 -38 10 50 31 46 29 6 -17 -1 -8 
                  
Total output
1 -45 -20 9 24 29 42 26 1 3 17 19 
Coverage share
2 77 72 63 62 63 65 59 59 61 65 62 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                  
Note: -- means insignificant.                 
1Assumes aggregate NRA calculated from commodities for which OECD computes market price support gives aggregate NRA for those commodities for which OECD does 
not     
compute market price support.                     
2Share of commodities for which OECD computes market price support in total agricultural output.               






Appendix Table 3: Consumer tax equivalents, Russia, 1992 to 2004            
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                    
Commodity 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                    
Grain -28 -24 -22 -15 -1  2 -14 -20 -11 -9  -20 
   Wheat  -39 -30 -28 -17 -3  1 -19 -22 -17 -8  -16 
   Corn  -35 -14 17 9 26  12 3 -8 1 10  -7 
   Barley  -3 -10 -14 -21 -4  -1 -6 -15 -6 -7  -11 
   Rye  -26 -37 -31 3 21  17 -14 -22 20 -9  -38 
   Oats  -15 -15 -13 -10 3  2 -4 -19 -3 -16  -36 
Sunflowerseed -52 -60 -40 -18 -29  -30 -32 -34 -35 -1  -24 
White sugar  -3 59 17 35 73  93 80 4 20 39  68 
                    
Meat -87 -57 -49 -25 -3  38 10 -8 10 49  52 
   Beef  -87 -66 -64 -45 -20  37 -6 -26 12 41  61 
   Pork  -88 -44 -28 -1 9  34 32 20 -6 35  41 
   Poultry  -83 -44 -25 4 26  47 14 -6 37 89  55 
Milk -76 -54 -40 26 38  59 38 15 6 2  30 
Eggs -81 -59 -29 16 13  34 19 -5 -24 -8  -18 
                    
Total consumption
1 -62 -38 -31 -6 5  18 7 -5 -1 8  11 
Coverage share
2 77 72 63 62 63  65 59 59 61 65  62 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                    
Note: -- means insignificant.                  
1Assumes aggregate CTE calculated from commodities for which OECD computes market price support gives aggregate CTE for those commodities for which OECD does not       
compute  market  price  support.                  
2Share of commodities for which OECD computes market price support in total agricultural output.                 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from OECD.                     
 